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Many people believe that Election 2000
proved only how divided the nation is over poli-
tics and policy. In contrast, this study draws six
lessons from Election 2000.
• Congress should set up a commission to
recommend changes in the electoral system;
the states should have the choice of accepting
the reforms and the obligation to pay for
them.
• The Electoral College should be preserved.
The framers designed the Electoral College to
limit arbitrary power. Abolishing the
Electoral College would weaken the states
and damage federalism.
• The United States is a constitutional repub-
lic, not a regime based on “the will of the peo-
ple.” Several politicians have appealed to the
will of the people in the Florida struggle. The
will of the people is a concept alien to the
American political tradition of limited, con-
stitutional government.
• Underlying public attitudes strongly sup-
ported limited government in Election 2000.
Both the platforms of the candidates and
public opinion polls indicate that the public’s
skepticism about government remains high. 
• Campaign spending enhanced turnout and
participation in Election 2000. Both the
NAACP and unions spent lavishly on getting
out the vote. If campaign spending is restrict-
ed, turnout will fall, contrary to the professed
desire of advocates of campaign finance
restrictions.
• Congress should not hold hearings about
media mistakes. Any punishment for errors
or bias by the networks on election night
should be left to public opinion. 
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Introduction
Many people now believe that Election
2000 in the United States yielded no clear
guidance for the world’s leading democracy.
The grounds for this view are not hard to dis-
cern: the narrow presidential election and the
ensuing struggle in Florida combined with
an evenly divided Senate and a small
Republican majority in the House of
Representatives. Accordingly, many people
now predict gridlock and rising partisanship.
We believe that the unrelenting focus on
the struggle in Florida for the presidency has
obscured the deeper meaning of Election
2000. This paper will explore six important
lessons from the election.
Congressional
Commission
Congress should set up a commission to
recommend changes in the nation’s electoral
systems; the states should have the choice of
accepting the reforms and the obligation to
pay for them.
Florida is not the only state that has prob-
lems with its election system. Other states
have reported claims of multiple voting, mul-
tiple voter registrations, voting by unquali-
fied persons (including legally disenfran-
chised felons), and other problems with their
voting systems and procedures.1 Although
Article I, section 4, of the U.S. Constitution
vests the power to prescribe the times, places,
and manner of holding elections for senators
and representatives in the state legislatures, it
also states, “but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Place of chusing Senators.”
The power to make or alter regulations cer-
tainly encompasses the power to make rec-
ommendations to the state and local govern-
ments on the holding of elections.  
It should be borne in mind, however, that
Article II, section 1, of the Constitution vests
the power to appoint electors for the office of
president exclusively in the state legislatures.
Article IV, section 4, of the Constitution also
guarantees “to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government,” which
certainly grants to Congress the power to
commission a report containing detailed
advice on how presidential elections should
be carried out. 
We call, therefore, upon Congress to
appoint a commission for the purpose of
examining the procedures for the popular
election of electors in the several states and to
make recommendations in at least four areas:
Registration Procedures
Reports of legally disenfranchised citizens
or of noncitizens casting ballots indicate that
additional safeguards may be necessary to
protect the integrity of the ballot. In some
cases, unqualified persons may believe that
they are in fact qualified to vote; in other
cases, they may intend to corrupt the process.
In either case, such “voting” cannot be toler-
ated in a constitutional republic based on the
concept of citizenship.
Voting Technology
Many American citizens were startled to
learn that the technology for casting and
recording votes in many areas of the country
is twice as old as some of the voters. As
Florida proves, such technology can become
an issue when the vote totals are extraordi-
narily close. Antiquated technology can lead
to both possible voter confusion and subjec-
tive judgments by canvassing officials, who
are called upon to “divine” the intent of the
voters in the cases of disputed ballots. Aged
technology thus brought us the “dimpled
chad,” a term that should be dropped from
the vocabulary of American elections. The
commission should examine the potential of
voting by computer and, more cautiously, the
prospects of Internet voting.
Identification of Qualified Voters
The process of receiving and casting bal-
lots is absurdly lax and must be reformed. In
most areas, people wishing to cast ballots
2
Florida is not the
only state that has
problems with its
election system.
need give the local election workers only a
name and an address to be issued a ballot. No
identification is requested. One could quite
easily vote a number of times merely by giv-
ing the names and addresses of registered
voters at a number of polling places. Further,
giving only a name and an address would
allow one to cast the ballot of another person
who might come in to vote later, only to find
that his or her ballot had already been cast.2
Absentee Ballots
The drive in recent years to increase the
use of absentee ballots has both diminished
the significance of a major act of citizenship
and opened many opportunities for electoral
fraud. Absentee ballots should be available
only to those who cannot go to a polling
place because of disability or absence. The
absentee system opens up great opportuni-
ties for dirty tricks and effective disenfran-
chisement of voters. For example, such bal-
lots in Oregon may have been collected by
strangers posing as election workers, who
then may or may not have mailed the ballots.
This form of voting should receive height-
ened scrutiny.
We wish to stress, however, that the run-
ning of elections is the proper province of the
states and localities, as prescribed in each
state by its legislature. Accordingly, the
report of a congressionally appointed com-
mission should be advisory only.
Some observers agree with Sen. Charles E.
Schumer (D-N.Y.), who has called for federal
matching grants to pay for changes in voting
systems.3 We disagree. The funding of elections,
including voting technology, election staffing,
and the like, should be left entirely to states and
localities. The running of elections is a legiti-
mate function of state and local governments,
and the temptation of a federal budget surplus
should not entice Congress to relieve states and
localities of their obligation to fund their own
elections. In addition, there is no power enu-
merated under Article I, section 8, of the U.S.
Constitution or elsewhere in the Constitution
that would authorize federal funding of elec-
tions held at the state or local level.4 Finally, we
know from experience in other policy areas that
federal funding rarely comes without strings
and that a new federal presence could expand in
the future. A permanent commission funded in
part by the federal government would push us
onto a slippery slope toward much greater
national control over all elections. State and
local governments alone have this constitution-
al responsibility.
The Electoral College 
The disputed election of 2000 has
brought many calls for changes in the way we
elect our presidents. Shortly after election
day, Senator-elect Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.)
proposed abolishing the Electoral College;
Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) had already intro-
duced a constitutional amendment to that
end. No doubt the Electoral College may pro-
duce a president-elect who did not win a plu-
rality of the popular vote. No doubt that’s
unfortunate. Is it enough to justify getting
rid of the Electoral College? Hardly. The
Electoral College still has several advantages
over direct election of the president.
Restraining Power
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were
worried that, like the republics of antiquity,
the new nation could degenerate over time
into a political tyranny. They sought to con-
strain and limit the exercise of arbitrary polit-
ical power through constitutional checks
and balances. Their debates about how to
elect the president focused primarily on lim-
iting power. They worried that if the presi-
dent were too strong, he might threaten indi-
vidual liberty. They knew also that the power
of Congress needed to be checked by the
president. As Gouverneur Morris noted, if
the president were not independent of
Congress, “usurpation and tyranny on the
part of the Legislature [would] be the conse-
quence.” The state legislatures at the time
had, in Madison’s words, “betrayed a strong
propensity to a variety of pernicious mea-
sures,” a tendency that should be checked by
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Congress. The framers’ search for a way to
elect the president while limiting the exercise
of arbitrary power led to the Electoral
College.5
How does the Electoral College limit the
abuse of power? The framers fully considered
direct election by the people. In 1789 and
today, direct election would mean election by
the great population centers, now mostly
found along the two coasts. The framers
feared that the populous states would abuse
this power and mistreat smaller states. By
allocating electors partly on the basis of
statehood (each state gets at least three), they
created an Electoral College that provides
some protection for small states. 
We should also keep the larger constitu-
tional picture in mind. The Constitution sets
up a system of federalism in which power is
shared by the national government and the
states. Just as the three branches limit and
check each other’s ambitions, federalism sets
up a separation of powers between the states
and the national government.6 In our time,
the states provide few constraints on a
national government that has become an
overweening force. The representation
accorded the states in the Electoral College
gives them some weight in the constitutional
balance and reinforces their role in our feder-
al system. Abolishing the Electoral College
would weaken the states and make the
national government more capable of abus-
ing its augmented power. 
Preserving Unity
The close outcome of Election 2000 and
the ensuing partisan bitterness indicate the
importance of a certain kind of national unity.
The United States has prospered as a diverse
society tied together by a “civic patriotism”
based on common laws, not on a common
language, religion, or ethnicity. Such unity is
not natural; many large, diverse nations like
ours have come apart over regional and ethnic
rivalries. Our “civic patriotism” is the founda-
tion of American liberty, peace, and prosperity.
We should not take our “from many, one,” our
E Pluribus Unum, for granted.
The Electoral College helps to unify the
United States. Once again, consider the alter-
native of direct election. Some presidential
candidates would probably try to roll up large
majorities in the metropolitan areas of the two
coasts and make some effort in the Midwest.
Others might focus on the rest of the country.
Both candidates and parties would repair to
their fiefdoms seeking as many votes as possi-
ble in “their” regions. Presidential elections
could become a battle between cities and rural
areas, large states and small, and the two
coasts and Middle America.
The Electoral College and the “winner-take-
all” rule adopted in almost all states force can-
didates to think more broadly.7 Imagine how a
candidate might plot his or her strategy to win
a majority of the Electoral College and thus the
White House. The candidate knows every vote
in a state in excess of 50 percent plus some
padding is superfluous. Since electors lead to
victory, the candidate will devote scarce
resources of time and money to potentially
competitive states anywhere in the nation. Why
should he or she focus on a few safe states and
regions running up ever-larger majorities? The
candidate receives the same number of electoral
votes from a state won with 51 percent as from
a state won with 90 percent. 
The Electoral College thus rewards candi-
dates who move beyond their power base and
punishes those who run purely sectional
campaigns. Indeed, the winner of the
Electoral College conflicts with the popular
vote winner only when one of the candidates
runs a sectional campaign (e.g., Grover
Cleveland in 1888). The Electoral College
makes presidential candidates broaden their
support whereas direct election encourages
regional fiefdoms. Abolishing the Electoral
College in favor of direct election of the pres-
ident would run the risk of exacerbating
regional and other tensions.  
The close outcome of Election 2000
revealed an unexpected advantage of the
Electoral College. Under direct election, Al
Gore would have initially won the presidency
by 250,000 or so votes. The recounts, the liti-
gation, and the uncertainty we saw in Florida
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would have been repeated nationwide. For
that reason, historian Alan Brinkley noted,
“Perhaps there will now be second thoughts
about changing the system.”8 National unity
would certainly be tested by a national
recount and its attendant struggles.
Possible Reform
Overlooked strengths notwithstanding, the
Electoral College as it currently functions is
not exempt from criticism. The framers of the
Constitution intended for the electors to exer-
cise a measure of independent judgment in
selecting the president.9 That independence
disappeared after the emergence of political
parties. Today when we vote for a candidate, we
actually select a slate of electors chosen by the
party and bound, morally and sometimes
legally,10 to vote for their party’s candidate in
the meeting of their state’s electors. 
Would a “faithless” elector present a prob-
lem for the nation? The faithless elector
poses two risks familiar to the framers of the
Constitution: corruption and disorder. 
The framers fretted much about prevent-
ing corruption and disorder in selecting a
president. In a close election, the temptation
to corrupt an elector would be overwhelm-
ing. Would an elector be corruptible?
Consider the situation and the likely sums
involved. With the presidency in the balance,
$20 million or more would be a small sum to
pay for an electoral vote. Extortion of electors
could also be a problem, again given the
stakes of the election. As for disorder, imag-
ine that a faithless elector changes his or her
vote and thereby the outcome of a presiden-
tial election.11 No one on the losing side (and
perhaps in much of the nation as a whole)
would believe the elector exercised indepen-
dent judgment aimed at the common good.
The “disorders and tumults” feared in
Philadelphia in 1787 might well become real
in our time.
We should act now to preclude the possi-
bility of faithless electors in the future. We
could amend the Constitution to remove the
“human factor” from the appointment of
electors. States could automatically cast their
electoral votes once the results of the election
were certified by the proper authorities.
Under this plan, there need be no human
electors at all. 
The “Will of the People”
The United States is a constitutional
republic, not a regime intended to embody
“the will of the people.” After a bitter and
acrimonious election campaign and a crisis
that threw the election of the president to the
House of Representatives, Thomas Jefferson
was elected president after 36 ballots. In his
First Inaugural Address, after a magnani-
mous appeal to Americans of both parties, he
exhorted his fellow citizens to rededicate
themselves to the principles of our govern-
ment: “Let us, then, with courage and confi-
dence pursue our own federal and republican
principles, our attachment to our union and
representative government.” Jefferson rightly
emphasized the republican and representa-
tive nature of American government, found-
ed on respect for law rather than on arbitrary
power, whether popular or autocratic.
In sharp contrast, we have heard much
about “the will of the people” in recent weeks.
Vice President Gore appealed to “the will of
the people” in his interview with CNN’s John
King on November 29, 2000, and his cam-
paign manager, William Daley, even went so
far as to state on November 11 that “if the
will of the people is to prevail, Al Gore should
be awarded a victory in Florida and be our
next president.”12 The normal rule, of course,
is to first determine who received the most
votes before talking about awarding victories,
but talk of the will of the people naturally
lends itself to declaring that a preexisting
“will” must determine who should be award-
ed a victory. And that will, as we have learned,
may be conjured through the divination of
the intent of voters, whether or not they actu-
ally cast valid ballots.
But such talk was not limited to leaders of
the Democratic Party. Their Republican
opponents responded in kind, as Rep. Curt
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Weldon (R-Pa.) did when he stated that he
would “use every ounce of energy I have to
deny the electors being seated if I believe the
political will of the people was thwarted by
the son of Mayor Daley of Chicago.”13 And
arguing before the U.S. Supreme Court on
behalf of George W. Bush’s campaign,
Theodore Olson stated, “What the court was
bound and determined to do was to get to a
consequence that the court determined was
consistent with the will of the people, irre-
spective of what the statute was.”14
Talk of the will of the people is profound-
ly misleading. Indeed, the idea of the will of
the people is a deeply authoritarian idea
completely at odds with the idea of govern-
ment under law.15 It derives, not from the
American Founders or from any “Whiggish”
antecedents in Britain’s constitutional histo-
ry, but from the radical authoritarian and
anti-liberal philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, who postulated a “general will” of
the people as the foundation of the state.
According to Rousseau in The Social Contract:
“[T]he general will is always right, and always
tends to the public good; but it does not fol-
low that the deliberations of the people will
always have the same rectitude. We always
desire our own good, but we do not always
recognize it. You cannot corrupt the people,
but you can often deceive it; and it is then
only that it seems to will something bad.”16
As political historian J. L. Talmon noted
in his classic study of the playing out of
Rousseauian politics, “The very idea of an
assumed preordained will, which has not yet
become the actual will of the nation . . . gives
those who claim to know and to represent
the real and ultimate will of the nation—the
party of the vanguard—a blank cheque to act
on behalf of the people, without reference to
the people’s actual will.”17 And, of course, the
natural spokesperson of such a will must be
the one person who receives the votes of the
entire nation, that is, the president. In con-
trast, each member of Congress represents
only a part of the nation. Therefore, only the
singular national leader can articulate the
will of the people and announce it to them.
The United States is not based on some
grand notion of the will of the people.
American government depends on the more
modest idea that the people may delegate cer-
tain limited powers to a representative govern-
ment operating on principles and procedures
set out in our the Constitution. In the words
of our Declaration of Independence, “to
secure these rights, governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed.” Government
does not derive total power but only a limited
set of “just powers.” Our consent by its nature
creates a limited government under law.
In contrast to the desire for a good and wise
ruler, whether ideologically clothed in the
divine right of kings or the will of the people,
James Madison described in Federalist no. 10 “a
republic, by which I mean a government in
which the scheme of representation takes
place.” Madison argued against the search for
wise rulers because, as he observed, “enlight-
ened statesmen will not always be at the
helm.” He also advised against “pure democ-
racy,” on the grounds that a system of delegat-
ing powers to elected representatives would
“refine and enlarge the public views” and allow
the public good to encompass much larger
and more diverse bodies of citizens.18
Our Constitution is based on delegated,
enumerated, and thus limited powers. It mixes
elements of popular representation (the
House of Representatives), indirect represen-
tation (the Senate, representing the states, and
the president, elected by the states), and
restraints on popular sentiment through the
rule of law (the federal judiciary). Our
Constitution is not a mechanism to articulate
the will of the people, unless by that vague
phrase one means the Constitution itself,
including all of its limitations on the powers
of majorities. Our Constitution was ordained
and established “in order to form a more per-
fect union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the popular defense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos-
terity.” It was not established to secure the will
of the people.
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The phrase “the will of the people”—along
with “dimpled chad”—has no place in a sys-
tem of equal liberty under law. Instead of
confusing ourselves with airy metaphysical
talk about the will of the people, we should,
with Jefferson, “with courage and confidence
pursue our own federal and republican prin-
ciples, our attachment to our union and rep-
resentative government.”
Support for Limited
Government
Support for limited government remains
strong. Many pundits and some politicians are
now saying that President-elect Bush should
try to govern through a bipartisan consensus
incorporating the ideas of his erstwhile oppo-
nent. Is this conventional wisdom correct?
Did the protracted election of George W. Bush
produce a mandate for compromising with Al
Gore’s agenda? The answer is no.
We should begin by looking at Election
2000 in a larger historical context. Since the tax
revolt in 1978, the United States has partially
reclaimed its legacy of limited, constitutional
government. The public mood has remained
skeptical of activist government, and tax cuts
have remained popular with the public. 
One of the leading candidates for presi-
dent in 2000 provided a pithy summary of
this public mood: 
I don’t ever want to see another era of
big government. . . . I’m opposed to
big government. . . . I’m for a smaller,
smarter government, one that serves
people better, but offers real change
and gives more choices to our fami-
lies. . . . I have believed in it long
before it was fashionable to do so in
the Democratic Party. . . . I don’t
believe there’s a government solution
to every problem. I don’t believe any
government program can replace the
responsibility of parents, the hard
work of families or the innovation of
industry.19
That was Al Gore in Shreveport, Louisiana,
on October 24, 2000. Oddly, for most of his
campaign, the vice president ran on expand-
ing government benefits and entitlements,
not on cutting back the state. However, the
fact that the Democratic candidate for presi-
dent felt the need to express his devotion to
limited government suggests its continuing
hold on the American people.
The two Clinton terms also indicate the
strength of this culture of limited govern-
ment. Clinton’s major domestic achievement
was welfare reform, a rolling back of govern-
ment in social policy. His greatest failure was
his plan to centralize and nationalize health
care, a mistake that generated enormous
opposition and suggests the powerful hold
freedom has on Americans.
What about during the 2000 election?
Has the “culture of limited government”
begun to wane? Didn’t the public want more
government rather than less? The preponder-
ance of the evidence shows that the public’s
desire for limited government persists.
Start with the programs of both candi-
dates. Bush emphasized across-the-board tax
cuts and partial privatization of Social
Security. The fact that Bush believed those
themes would bring victory indicates the
continuing appeal of limited government.
Al Gore, in contrast, ran an old-fashioned
“populist” campaign that pitted “working
families” against big business, defined as Big
Drugs, Big Tobacco, or Big Oil. Gore dallied
with the rhetoric of class war, defining him-
self as the protector of the common man
against the depredations of the “wealthiest
1%.” For Gore, government was not a prob-
lem but rather a defense against the oppres-
sion of working families. The rhetoric of class
warfare implied expanded government.
Gore’s ploy failed miserably. He did win
the popular vote by a plurality of almost
300,000, a lackluster showing considering
that he ran as a virtual incumbent during the
best economic conditions since the 1960s.
Gore should have received anywhere from 53
percent to 60 percent of the overall vote
according to predictive models founded on
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economic data.20 He thus fell short of this
“normal” performance by 3 to 11 percent of
the vote. Gore’s class war themes may (or may
not) have caused that shortfall. We can say
with certainty, however, that his rhetoric did
not find a ready audience in an electorate still
committed to limited government. 
Our analysis of exit poll results and public
opinion data also clearly demonstrates that
most voters supported George W. Bush’s
stated desire for a smaller, less-intrusive fed-
eral government. An ABC News poll revealed
that 6 of 10 voters prefer “smaller govern-
ment with fewer services.”21 During the
course of the campaign, 60 percent of voters
thought that Bush’s policy prescriptions
were either “about right” or “too liberal,” sug-
gesting considerable support for Bush’s lim-
ited government stance.22 A plurality of one-
third of voters told exit polls that Bush
reflected their own personal view of the role
of government in society.23
A majority also said that the government
currently does things that are better left to
businesses and to individuals. Only 4 of every
10 voters said that the government should do
more to solve America’s problems.24 As the
New York Times’s Robin Toner and Janet Elder
reported just after election day: “Mr. Bush’s
argument that government’s role in public
life needed to be reduced clearly resonated.
That philosophy of restricting government
was shared . . . by many voters.”25
Naysayers may argue that the electorate
embraces limited government in the abstract
but prefers more government when it serves
their interests. However, the data belie this
argument in several significant policy areas,
including taxes, Social Security, and health care.
In response to a question about what the
new president should do first, the second
most popular answer (just behind “improve
education”) was “cut taxes.” Not only did vot-
ers choose tax cutting over strengthening
Social Security, but tax cutting also won out
(by a five-to-two ratio) over the curbing of
prescription drug prices. Similarly, when
asked what the top priority for the budget
surplus should be, 52 percent of voters said
either that the government should cut the
income tax or that it should reduce the
national debt.26 A paltry 6 percent wanted
the government to increase the funding of
social programs other than Social Security.
Asked about tax plans, a majority chose a
larger, across-the-board tax cut rather than a
smaller tax cut targeted to lower- and middle-
income people.27 Furthermore, a poll con-
ducted in late October by the Washington Post
and Harvard University found that a plurality
of Americans didn’t view Bush’s tax cut plan
as economically risky.28 Finally, we note that,
according to the Center on Policy Attitudes,
the public remains steadfastly opposed to the
federal government’s undertaking any new
program that requires higher taxes.29
Perhaps most important of all, we learned
that Social Security reform is no longer the
“third rail” of American politics. Bush’s pro-
posal for a partially privatized program for
younger Americans helped, rather than hin-
dered, his quest for the White House.
According to exit polls, 57 percent of voters
support a plan under which individuals could
invest some of their Social Security taxes in the
stock market.30 By contrast, Gore’s scaremon-
gering on this issue resonated with only 39
percent of the electorate. What’s more, accord-
ing to a poll conducted in the summer of 2000
by the Center on Policy Attitudes, an over-
whelming majority of Americans do not want
to save Social Security by increasing taxes or
taking on new debt.31
Finally, a look at the data (rather than
visually arresting and vocal protests) shows
that Americans fully support the free market
internationally, as well as domestically.
According to the Washington Post/Harvard
University poll, for example, Americans
believe that globalization is good for the U.S.
economy by a two-to-one margin.32
In sum, the presidential election of 2000
was closely split between George W. Bush and
Al Gore. The underlying views of the public,
however, were not evenly divided. Most
Americans remain where they have been since
1978: supportive of limited government and
free markets and extremely skeptical of vast
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public initiatives. These libertarian attitudes
should define the next administration.
Campaign Spending
Advocates of further restrictions on cam-
paign finance claim to be the true friends of
democracy. They argue that campaign dona-
tions corrupt and degrade American politics
and enforce the rule of a wealthy elite. They
propose limits on campaign contributions,
bans on soft money (that is, money not regu-
lated by federal law), and new regulations on
television and radio advertising by political
groups. Are the advocates of restrictions true
friends of democracy?
Advocates of strict campaign finance reg-
ulation usually believe that the more people
are involved in politics, the healthier and bet-
ter our democracy is. Getting more people
involved requires time, effort, and, yes,
money. Restricting the flow of money is like-
ly to reduce both public attention to candi-
dates and turnout at the polls. Election 2000
provides strong evidence of how campaign
spending boosts turnout. Consider the fol-
lowing examples:
The NAACP funded “Operation Big Vote”
with $9 million in soft money. Tamar Jacoby
describes the efforts supported by this money:
Paid staffers and volunteers scoured
the country for black voters, targeting
the unregistered in shopping malls,
nightclubs, black churches, even
southern prisons, where they harvest-
ed some 11,000. As the election
approached, the NAACP’s army
manned telephone banks and
knocked on doors; messages urging
blacks to get to the polls aired on BET
and in Magic Johnson Theaters.33
Heather Booth, director of the National Voter
Fund of the NAACP, said the organization’s
lobbying arm, Americans for Equality, spent
an additional $10.5 million on radio, televi-
sion, and newspaper advertising; direct mail;
phone calls; and other get-out-the-vote activi-
ties, including three bus tours to 10 cities in
seven days. She noted that the organization
had 80 field organizers in battleground states
and dispatched 8,000 volunteers to knock on
40,000 doors in each of 20 targeted cities.
The NAACP’s efforts yielded striking
results. Ron Lester, a pollster and consultant
to the National Voter Fund, argued that exit
polls showed that an estimated 925,557 more
black Americans voted in 2000 than in 1996
in battleground states targeted by the
NAACP. Four hundred thousand of those
votes were cast in Florida, with obvious
results. The spending by the group also
helped register 200,000 in the last two
months of the campaign.34 Massive “soft
money” spending played an important part
in 1 million more black Americans voting in
2000 than in 1996. 
Unions spent more than $45 million on
Election 2000. The AFL-CIO and the
American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees spent $6 million on
phone calls and trucks broadcasting political
messages to black and Latino neighbor-
hoods. AFSCME made 850,000 get-out-the-
vote calls in battleground states. AFL-CIO
operatives handed out 14 million leaflets,
mailed 12 million pieces of campaign litera-
ture, and made 8 million phone calls. Once
again, the results were striking. Exit polls
indicated voting by union households rose
three percentage points over 1996, which
translated into 4.1 million more union votes,
according to AFL-CIO political director Steve
Rosenthal.35
Of course, other groups from across the
political spectrum were also active. The
Christian Coalition distributed 70 million
voter guides, three times the number handed
out in 1996. The National Rifle Association
spent between $15 million and $20 million
on mobilizing voters.36
Curtis Gans, a leading scholar of the
American electorate, noted that overall
turnout rose about two percentage points over
1996. Why? Gans explained: “I think it was driv-
en by, indeed, the voter mobilization efforts . . .
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from the NRA to the labor unions to the
blacks to the Christian Coalition, because the
difference between the other states whose
turnout averaged downward and these states
was indeed these mobilization efforts. They
didn’t exist in those other states.”37
Election 2000 suggests the contradictions
of campaign finance “reform.” If the NAACP,
the NRA, the unions, the Christian
Coalition, the two parties, and others had
not spent more than $100 million informing
voters and getting out the vote, the participa-
tion rate would have been much lower than
the 50.7 percent achieved. Those who plump
for restrictions on campaign contributions
and spending would really encourage lower
turnout and less participation. Of course,
higher turnout and more participation are
the professed goals of those who would
restrict the role of money in politics. Turnout
rose because money flowed into our political
system in 2000, a fact that should not be for-
gotten as Congress once again considers new
regulations on campaign finance. 
Media Mistakes
Congress should not hold hearings about
media mistakes, even though election night
2000 was a disaster for the TV networks.
They early on announced that Al Gore had
won Florida, retracted that call a couple of
hours later, awarded Florida and the election
to George W. Bush around 2 A.M., and final-
ly withdrew that call as the sun rose on
November 8. The TV networks turned in
their worst performance in the era defined
by exit polls.
The first call for Gore came about 10 min-
utes before the polls closed in the western
Panhandle of Florida, which is in a different
time zone than the rest of the state. The 10
Panhandle counties are heavily Republican.
To some Bush supporters, the early call
seemed aimed at suppressing mostly
Republican votes in the Panhandle and else-
where by causing late voters not to vote.38
After all, if Al Gore had won Florida already,
why should a Republican bother to vote? 
Republicans were outraged. Rep. Billy
Tauzin (R-La.) said that because broadcasters
were making early calls on states going to
Gore and delaying calls on states Bush was
carrying, “you receive a picture of America
believing that Al Gore was sweeping the
country, that George W. Bush was having
trouble carrying his states.” The situation
suggests, he said, a “very disturbing picture, I
think, of probable bias.”39
Representative Tauzin later cited a large
survey of Republican voters in the
Panhandle; that survey suggested that the
early call had cost George W. Bush some
17,000 votes, or 6 percent of his overall total,
in those counties. Tauzin also cited a study
by John Lott Jr. based on a model predicting
Bush’s share of the vote in the Panhandle.
The Lott study suggested the early call
caused a 4 percent suppression of the
Republican turnout in those counties.40
According to the Washington Post’s Howard
Kurtz, a majority of Americans believe that
calling Florida early may have affected voting
elsewhere.41
Never great believers in the fairness or accu-
racy of the news media, Republicans may now
assume that network bosses sympathetic to
Gore boldly sought to influence the Florida
election. Republican lawmakers may be
tempted to act on that assumption and per-
haps punish the networks for what they see as
political meddling and biased projections. 
Attacking the news media may find favor
with the public. According to a survey taken
just after the election by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press:
Media miscalls of the outcome of the
presidential race on Tuesday have
only intensified voters’ long-standing
criticisms of press performance.
Seven-in-ten voters (69%) voice anger
or disappointment with the net-
works’ premature calls that George W.
Bush had won the presidency. More
than half of voters (52%) believe the
networks’ earlier mistake of calling
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Florida for Gore may have had an
effect on how people in other parts of
the country voted (with as many as
58% of those in the West supporting
this view). Little wonder that the per-
ception that the media had too much
of an influence on the outcome
climbed to 53% in the current survey
from 47% in 1996 and 46% in 1992.42
The data suggest that a government assault
on the news media would be popular, espe-
cially among Republicans, more than half of
whom believe Bush was treated unfairly in
general by the media.
You don’t have to believe that the news
media avoid all bias to worry about public
officials regulating the news media. Certainly
any government regulation of when and how
the media report the results of exit polls
would contravene the prohibitions explicitly
stated in the First Amendment. The freedom
of the press protected by the Constitution
includes a freedom to make mistakes, includ-
ing errors that harm political interests, a view
sanctioned long ago by the Supreme Court
in New York Times v. Sullivan.43
A case could be made that government
could legitimately shame the networks by call-
ing them to account for their decisions, espe-
cially if they sought to influence the outcome
of an election. According to this view, govern-
ment cannot censor the news media, but it can
hold the networks up for public condemna-
tion, thereby increasing accountability.
Increasing accountability, in turn, might lead
to more fair and balanced reporting and there-
by improve democratic choice.
This argument assumes government
should try to improve communication in our
democracy by pushing the news media to do a
better job. This premise shows up in other pol-
icy areas. It leads campaign finance reformers
to denounce the “negativity” of campaigns
and to urge government to regulate their con-
tent to improve political dialogue. 
Government should not try to improve
political dialogue in a free society. That job
properly belongs to the free marketplace of
ideas. Government should remain neutral
toward speakers in that marketplace. After all,
should a government run by incumbent
officeholders decide if a political ad is “too
negative”? Do we trust public officials to select
and enforce “true religion”? And finally, does
anyone think politicians have any worthwhile
insights about “better speech”? Our system of
government answers no to all three questions.
The First Amendment protects several aspects
of civil society—religion, association, speech—
from government intervention.
Supporters of a free society should also
worry that congressional hearings would
have a chilling effect on the news media.
While we assume that members of Congress
would start such hearings with the best of
intentions, congressional investigations have
a way of going beyond their original aims. If
the hearings did intimidate the news media,
free speech would be chilled, and the prece-
dent would be troubling. Democrats might
hear a lot about “liberal bias” in the next few
months, but future elections could lead to
Democratic majorities who would hold hear-
ings about “conservative bias” in the media.
Intimidating the media is a game no one
wins over the long run. It’s a game that
should not be played at all.
None of this means the news media and
the networks should be exempt from criti-
cism. But civil society—the private sector—
should be both judge and jury in the case of
the news media and Election 2000.44 Without
congressional hearings, we have already seen
the public humiliation of powerful people like
news anchors and network presidents fol-
lowed by contrite apologies. Further investiga-
tions by the press and by private political
groups are entirely in order. As ever, more
speech, not congressional investigations, is the
best response to the mistakes made by the
news media in Election 2000. 
Conclusion
Election 2000 has ended in confusion and
considerable political conflict. Troubles
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notwithstanding, we can see several impor-
tant implications for public policy in the
United States over the next four years.
Significant majorities of Americans want less
government and lower taxes. That concern
for limited government should also lead us
to preserve the Electoral College, to leave the
news media alone, and to cease all talk about
the will of the people. Election 2000 also gave
us some reason to believe that additional reg-
ulation of campaign finance is likely to belie
the intentions of its advocates. In sum,
Election 2000 shows the continuing vitality
of the American political tradition of limited
government and individual liberty.
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